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CLARIFICATION REGARDING CASE AUTHORITIES 
As is apparent from the briefing on the State's Petition, the issue of territorial 
jurisdiction will turn on this Court's application of Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation v. Utah. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985)(Uteffl), and 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 
1997)(UteV), vis-a-vis Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. 544,101 S.Ct. 1245,67 
L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). In distillation, this Court must determine what application, if any, 
Montana has to lands 'that remain the exclusive province of the Tribe and the federal 
government," Ute V, 114 F.3d at 1528, for which "ownership of the land by the tribal 
group" has not been disturbed, Ute Hi 773 F.2d at 1092, on a reservation that "has not 
been disestablished or diminished," id at 1093. It is safe to say that this Court's reading 
of UtejII, Ute V, and Montana will determine the issue of territorial jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Ute Partition Act expelled the Uintah Band as a body from the Ute Tribe-
In 1956, the Ute Tribe drew up rolls in accordance with section 677g of the Ute 
Partition Act (UP A). 25 U.S.C. 677-677aa. Prior to this time, no roll of the entire Ute 
Tribe existed, as each band had maintained its own, separate roll. Under 677g, one roll 
would thereafter constitute the membership of the Ute Tribe, while the other roll would 
consist of persons to be terminated from federal supervision. Once the rolls were drawn 
up, 208 members of the Uintah Band appeared on the membership roll of the Ute Tribe. 
The Ute Tribe itself concedes as much in its brief. Amicus Br., p. 10. 
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It would seem obvious that once 209 or more members of that same band were 
listed on the termination roll (i.e., 50.12% or more), the Uintah Band became a termi-
nated tribe. In fact, 456 Uintahs, or 68.68% of the listed membership were terminated. In 
addition, Mr. Reber and Mr. Thunehorst's mother were among 220 Uintahs living at the 
time who were not included on either roll, but were nevertheless denied membership in 
the Ute Tribe solely in consequence of the UPA. The de facto effect of the UP A on the 
Uintah Band living in 1956 (208 listed as Utes, 456 listed for termination, 220 terminated 
by implication, i.e., 676 out of 884), was to terminate 76.47% of the Uintah Band - over 
three quarters of its membership! 
A. Where 75% of a tribe goes, there goes the tribe. 
The 208 Uintahs enrolled in the Ute Tribe certainly could not expel the bulk of 
their own band. "An expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void act." Bouldin v. 
Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 140, 15 Wall. 131, 140, 21 LJEd. 69, 72 (1872). Beyond that, it 
really doesn't matter whether the Uintah Band asked to be expelled (they never did), or 
whether the UPA mentions the Uintah Band or not. There is simply no authority that 
explains how three quarters of a tribe can be expelled without expelling the tribe itself. It 
is well established, however, that a band that acts and contends independently of a tribe 
ceases to be a part of that tribe. Montova v. United States. 180 U.S. 261,269-270,21 
S.Ct. 358, 361-362, 45 L.Ed. 521 (1901). 
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This Court is thus left with three undisputed facts: 
1. The Uintah Band is the only band that can claim any rights under the Act of 
May 5,1864, which declared that the Uintah Valley reservation be "set apart for the 
permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Indians 
of said [Utah] territory as may be induced to inhabit the same." Act of May 5,1864, ch. 
57, 13 Stat. 64 (Emphasis added). 
2. At least 70% of the members of that same Uintah Band were terminated from 
federal supervision under the Ute Partition Act of 1954. 25 U.S.C. §§677-677aa. 
3. No authority exists explaining how any body politic would not be found where 
more than 50% of its membership goes. 
B. The Uintah Band possesses all the rights of a terminated tribe. 
The rules governing the rights of terminated tribes are entirely different from those 
governing the relationship between a single tribe and its former members. A substantial 
body of federal case law clearly defines the rights of terminated tribes. See, e.g., 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,412, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 1711, 20 L.Ed.2d 
697 (1968); Timpanogos Tribe v. Conwav. 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). Indeed, it is 
significant that when individual members of the Uintah Band presented themselves to the 
Tenth Circuit under a different name, the Tenth Circuit had no hesitation affirming that 
both terminated and unrecognized tribes retain all hunting rights. Conwav, 286 F.3d at 
1203. 
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The Ute Tribe has attempted to frame this matter as an w/ra-tribal dispute between 
an Indian tribe and its individual former members. The facts belie this. As the numbers 
plainly indicate, this is an w/er-tribal dispute, a dispute between two tribes. One of those 
tribes receives federal benefits. The other retains all treaty rights under the Act of May 5, 
1864. All of the arguments of the Ute Tribe must be considered in this light. 
C. The provisions of the Ute Constitution have no bearing on the Uintah Band. 
The Ute Tribe attempts to define the Uintah Band in terms of the 1937 Ute 
Constitution, without reference to the 1954 termination act. This would be analogous to 
Queen Victoria attempting to define the rights of the State of Massachusetts under the 
English Constitution, without reference to the events of 1776. The only provisions of the 
Ute Constitution relevant to the Ute Tribe's present relationship with the Uintah Band are 
the Preamble and Article VI, § 1. The Preamble states: 
We, the Ute Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver 
Bands hereafter to be known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation, in order to establish a more responsible tribal organiza-
tion, promote the general welfare, encourage educational progress, conserve 
and develop our lands and resources, and secure to ourselves and our 
posterity the power to exercise certain rights of home rule, not inconsistent 
with the Federal State and local laws, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
(Emphasis added). The Ute constitution is thus subject to supervening federal law. This is 
affirmed in Article VI, §1, of the same constitution, which states: 
The Tribal Business Committee of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
shall exercise the following powers, subject to any limitation imposed by 
the statutes or the Constitution of the United States. 
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(Emphasis added). Both prior and subsequent to 1937, the rights of the three bands were 
governed by three separate sets of federal laws. Only the Uintah Band retained any rights 
under the Act of May 5,1864, as the other two bands were not "Indians of said [Utah] 
territory" as set forth under that Act. By its own terms, the Ute Constitution did not 
abrogate any of those prior laws, and is subject to them. Article VI, §4, of that 
constitution states: 
"Any rights and powers heretofore vested in the Tribe or bands of 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation but not expressly referred to in this 
Constitution shall not be abridged by this article, but may be exercised by 
the people of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation through the adoption of 
appropriate By-laws and constitutional amendments." 
(Emphasis added). Read in conjunction with the Preamble and Article VI, §1, it is 
apparent that the Ute Constitution did not and could not have any effect on the prior 
vested rights reserved to the separate bands under federal law. It is for this very reason 
that the three bands found it necessary, in 1950, to enter into agreements governing the 
distribution of funds relative to their separate claims against the United States. C-P 
Op.Br. at 5-7. The Ute Tribe has appended the agreements to its brief. Amicus Br., Add. 
D. This Court can search those agreements in vain for any language dissolving the 
separate rights or identities of the three bands. 
These agreements were enacted into law by federal statute, which under the 
Preamble and Article VI, §1, of the Ute Constitution renders them superior to that 
constitution. 25 U.S.C. §672. Needless to say, the UPA also constitutes a federal law. 25 
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U.S.C. 677-677aa. The UPA's effect of removing the Uintah Band from the Ute Tribe 
thus supersedes the provisions of the Ute Constitution by that constitution's own terms. 
The Uintah Band is thus no longer subject to that constitution. Accordingly, since 1954, 
the Ute Tribe has not asserted any rights under the Act of May 5, 1864, in any proceeding. 
By the Ute constitution's own terms, the only link still remaining between the Ute 
Tribe and the Uintah Band would be the 1950 agreements, inasmuch as they, too, consti-
tute federal law. Indeed, Resolution No. 3 now remains the sole vehicle by which the Ute 
Tribe might arguably assert any right to hunt or fish on the Uintah Valley Reservation at 
all. Resolution No. 3 was enacted by the three bands to "compromise and settle all 
existing controversies between themselves as to the ownership of lands," although the Ute 
Tribe does not tell us what those controversies were. Thus far, no federal court has 
implied that the 1954 termination act did anything to alter the 1950 agreements. 
D. No case has ever addressed the expulsion of the Uintah Band from the Ute 
Tribe. 
Since 1954, only two cases have addressed the rights of the Uintah Band as 
distinct from the Ute Tribe. Hackford v. Babbitt. 14 F.3d 1457 (10th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Murdoch 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997). The Ute Tribe now relies on both these 
cases for the proposition that the Uintah Band has no existence separate from the Ute 
Tribe. However, in neither case did the court address the specific effect of the UPA on the 
Uintah Band, as in neither case was the court presented with the raw numbers. 
In Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit reviewed 
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the 1937 constitution and the 1950 agreement roncludiiu' ill mi a\ of |M^H ihi (linn 
bands constituted a unified tribe. 14 F.Sd at 1461. The case makes no further findings in 
regard to the Uintah Band. Indeed, it explicitly refrains from addressing Mr II J 
separate claim - - intah Band. fin: iding that u.. pnorn\ oi all water on 
the reservation dates from the Executive Order of Octohrr ,^ Ik61, regardless of hand 
affiliation. 14 F.3dat 1469. 
Having aaure^eu UK .. • • ih Band only through 1950, the court then addressed the 
relai* o ^T»VK -•• k - : - ., \ » ^ rawing no 
connection whatsoever between the "Mixed-bloods" and **v 1 - •: *h n.-n.*1 * I F 3d at 
1461 1464. Nowhere does the opinion remotely suggest that the Tenth Circuit was ever 
apprised of any such connection. I lad the court been informed that the "Mixed-bloods" 
constituted 76 4nou of flu* 1 JitiUili Rand HI hardK UXIM have avoided addressing this 
compelling and decisive issue. 
Instead, the court's analysis of Mr. Hackford's rights as a "Mixed-blood" explicitly 
•.ca\ i> ui J queMiv:. oi ms ngiits as a Uintah unanswered. 14 F.3d at 1469. This extensive 
treatment of the < n<' wiihmii rdavtiiv »"» 'In: ^I'KT confirms MOI HIII) dun the court was 
not aware of any connection betw v^« .AC two, but that Mr. Hackford ne\ nr--., 
an argument, \n examination of the record before the Tenth Circuit confirms this. 
:>:L:mi;eau;;;>, u\^ court did note thai e-rinntion of the mixed-blood Flos, 
divi-:••*•••''!»-•-•• • * :i^* .. , oi-iiLvdii.;:;. 11)(" under the Partition Act 
8 
has spawned extensive litigation to which this case adds a new dimension." 14 F.3d at 
1463. That litigation has been extensive precisely because no court has yet addressed the 
effect of terminating three fourths of a tribe. There is no "sleight of hand" in pointing this 
out. Any court may take judicial notice that 676 constitutes 76.47% of 884. 
The Murdock case was a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §1165 for fishing on tribal 
lands without a permit.1 Perry Murdock was born in 1968 to two parents who were 
included on the termination rolls. His first argument before the Tenth Circuit was simply 
that he was a member of the Ute Tribe, notwithstanding the UPA, and without reference 
to the Uintah Band. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument out of hand. United States v. 
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 540. He then argued that he had rights as a member of the Uintah 
Band, without reference to the UPA. Id. The Tenth Circuit accordingly dispensed of his 
argument, likewise without reference to the UPA. 132 P.3d at 541. 
Indeed, the court based its ruling on nothing more than the 1937 constitution, 
without so much as a reference to the 1950 agreements. With 1937 as its point of 
departure, it is fair to say that a court could very well consider the subsequent effects of 
the 1954 UPA on the Uintah Band, and on the 1937 constitution, without doing violence 
to the Murdock court's reasoning at all. The Murdock court clearly did not address this 
issue. As in Hackford. a review of the record before the Tenth Circuit confirms the court 
was never apprised that the UPA terminated 676 out of 884 members of the Uintah Band. 
lrThe case was brought in federal court, the only forum under Ute V possessing 
jurisdiction to address tribal rights on tribal lands. 
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E. The Ute Tribe's arguments arc internally inconsistent. 
The Ute Tribe's assertion that the Uintah Band still exists within the Ute Tribe 
(Amicus Br., p 6, n 1) is on a collision, course with its assertion that a generic Ute Tribe 
\ cited to 3xpel the "ft lixed bk>< ; - mat the Uintah I land has any 
identity anywhere, one cannot escape the fact, acknow lodged h\ ' \ * ' *'K «-'f 
(Amicus Br., p 10) that at least 7 0 % of that band was terminated by the UFA. To argue 
otherwise would require mat inc Uintah Band have no identity anywhere, thus contrad! 
ting both A rticlr III, ^  *. *• , < '• .' :'-.rx s own assertions. 
1. Either the Uintah Band exists or it doc> \ - * * - - ; • . ^ ^ f l - *h »- ;\ sqiarali/" 
Uintah Band existed prior to 1 y.?7. and that a separate Uintah Band was a party to the 
1,950 agreements, i r.ere is likewise no question that the Ute Tribe did not create a single 
tribal mil until 1 ^ 6 , mil thai lo this da> ii still maintain a rvenrd ol band affiliation on 
that roll. 
^ ' lie Law 717, passed by Congress in 1956, required a vote of the Uintah Band 
in !',Lij.i'u VJ no separate assets. Both terminated and non-terminated members participated, 
demonstrating that (I "'i notwithstanding the ! ()50 agreements, tin; Uuilah Band possessed 
separate assets, and (2) Congress considered those expelled from,, the I Jte Tribe i n ider the 
1 n : A AsCt t 0 n e v e r t h e l e s s be members of the Uintah Band. 
Notwithstanding nobody denies the continued existence of three bands , the Ute 
Tribe argues that for one magical moment in IVlaali„ 19:;» -I, the Ute i n b e was completely 
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homogenous, with no band affiliations whatsoever. Thus, despite numbers demonstrating 
that the Uncompahgre and Whiteriver bands had in fact united to expel the Uintahs, the 
tribal attorneys could report to Congress with a straight face that 'the Tribe" had voted as 
a body to terminate part of itself. This argument could only be plausible if in fact the 
Tribe had not kept separate rolls subsequent to 1950, if the Ute Constitution did not 
provide to this day for representation of three bands, and if Congress had not passed 
legislation subsequent to 1954 recognizing the separate identity and assets of the Uintah 
Band. Once it is acknowledged, however, that a Uintah Band exists anywhere, one cannot 
escape the consequences of including three quarters of that band on the termination rolls. 
2. "Voluntariness" of termination is irrelevant to the identity of the Uintah Band. 
The Ute Tribe seems to put great stock in its allegation that the members of the Uintah 
Band "chose" to be terminated. Even if this self-serving misrepresentation were true, it 
bears no relevance to the facts of this case. 
The Ute Tribe seems to assume the Respondents are somehow trying to undo 
termination. Quite to the contrary, Respondents9 position is that it's time to call a spade a 
spade. Since termination is a fact of life, it's time to acknowledge that a whole tribe was 
terminated, not just a group of individuals. Even if those individuals "chose" to be 
terminated from the Confederated Ute Tribe, nobody can seriously argue that they 
"chose" to be terminated from their identity as members of the Uintah Band. 
Moreover, the Ute Tribe would seem to imply that "voluntary" termination would 
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somehow change the significance c-i :'v ni imbers 76 '17% ul lln I IniLih Baml remains the 
majority of that tribe, whether they w alked a v * ay from the Ute Tribe voluntarily or were 
thrust c ; ai guh^oim. S he Ule I ribe cannot now seriously challenge the accuracy of the 
i I-* • *• Tiallenged in the trial cot irt 
3. The UFA clearly targeted the I 'iniali Band : : 
to imply that termination was not partisan, inasmuch as a few members of the Uncompah-
gre and driver bands were terminated alongside the Uintahs. Amicus Br., p. 10 n . 
Agfiiii, the niiiTihci's siicak for llieniselves As mdu :,J; \\. me exmou >.«i)nuticd to the 
trial court, to the Court of Appeals, and to this (V s • ? • * ,...•,.-
gres and Whiterivers were terminated. C-P Op. Br., Add. E. This in comparison wiiii 45o 
I iiniahs, i" Joretn ci\ those S4 t incompahgres and Whiterivers comprise the bulk of those 
very \\%\\ "l\\]]-h)iuu\" imJividituN who genuinely had :i choice wnetnerornottobe 
included on the "mixed-blood" roll. The lite Tribe^ ri-.-. K; ;s i 
!
 - 'iided on the termination roll is limited to these individuals. 
One cannot help but wonder if those token Uncompahgres and Whiterivers were 
included - t! • ' - - J '«'•••* •- ; ;,:;-,K.- O\ enabling uu . ^ »•. .-x- lo attempt this 
specious defense in 2006. There would actually be some IIKTII h»I heir argumenl if llu1 
r™vined membership of the Uncompahgre and Whiteriver bands in 1956 amounted to 
TC than 05 souls. : ii. ,, however, would still raise the question as to how 276 "Utes" 
•s.-
;
 \ p . - i a < - » - x. ^ ] -.- ' ' ;^r.i....- M-J- ;, I ribe''s reference to terminated 
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Uncompahgres and Whiterivers proves nothing. If 51% of either the Uncompahgre or 
Whiteriver bands had been terminated under the UPA, they too would be co-defendants in 
this action. 51% is 51%. 
4. The assertions of the Ute Tribe contradict the UP A itself. Nowhere bis it been 
asserted that the UPA eliminated the separate identity of the bands. To the contrary, 
section 677r states: "Nothing in sections 677-677aa of this title shall affect any claim 
heretofore filed against the United States by the tribe, or the individual bands comprising 
the tribe." The UPA clearly recognizes the existence of separate bands. 
Moreover, sections 677d, 677i, and 677o(a) make clear that those assets "not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution" remain the common property of both 
the Utes and "Mixed-bloods." By a strange irony, those assets seem to coincide in large 
part with what elsewhere are known as "treaty rights." 
In United States v. Felten 546 F.Supp. 1002 (D.Utah 1982) the district court held 
that hunting and fishing rights constitute an asset not susceptible of equitable and 
practicable distribution under the UPA. 546 F.Supp. at 1023. It then opined, since the 
issue was not before it, that those rights are not inheritable. Id. at 1025. This clearly 
contradicts 25 U.S.C. §677i, which states in pertinent part: 
After such division the rights or beneficial interests in tribal property 
of each mixed-blood person whose name appears on the roll shall constitute 
an undivided interest in and to such property which may be inherited or 
bequeathed. 
(Emphasis added). As with all termination acl Ihi ',TI'v1 ofli",11,1>A «i limM',1'''« 
termination of federal benefits: 
X Jpon removal of Federal restrictions on the property of each 
individual mixed-blood member of the tribe, the Secretary shall publish in 
the Federal Register a proclamation declaring that the Federal trust 
relationship to such individual is terminated. Thereafter, such individual 
shall not be entitled to any of the services performed for Indians because of 
his status as an Indian. All statutes of the United States which affect Indians 
because of their status as Indians shall i •-. iger be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has been terminated, and the laws of the 
several States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply 
to other citizens within their jurisdiction. 
25 U.S.C. §677v. (Emphasis added). I Jnder (IK* 111M| limiting and fishing rights UHISIIIIIU: 
a "tribal asset." In all other ten: i cases, hunting and fishing rights are defined as a 
"treaty right/"' See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 I..S. 404, 412, 88 S.Ct. 
1 *< -\-A identity and existence, no less than the hunting 
and fishing rich's that attach t identity, are treaty rights, m r f federal benefits k i In 
sharp contrast to federal benefits, treaty rights are not subject to termination, Timpanogos 
Inbev. Conwav. 286 F.3d 1195. 1202 (10th Cir. 2002). 
N
 * ermmauon Uuo* nut tcnmiiaic inoai laeiuti). m its own terms, the UP A is 
limited to the termination of federal supervision ^ I ',S (' ^hl '> Absent specific 
Congressional language overriding the logical presumption that the majority of a body 
constitutes the body, or explicit language expressing an intent to define or obliterate the 
I lintah Hand, llic 11 tulah Hand niuist exisl where the majority of its members are found. 
Ignoring the effect of the 1 M* \ on flic ! Mutah Man.l nuuid allou one tribe to use 
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the state and federal courts as a means to obliterate the existence of a rival tribe and 
appropriate to itself all of the obliterated tribe's treaty rights. This squarely contradicts the 
well-established canon of construction, specifically applicable to those terminated under 
the UP A, that any ambiguities in an act affecting Indian rights be interpreted in favor of 
the Indians. United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1985). If the State of 
Utah now wants to take sides in a dispute between two tribes, it does so at its own peril. 
A grave injustice has been committed here. A termination act has been extended 
beyond its scope to not only terminate federal benefits, but to strip an entire people of 
their heritage, their identity, and their treaty rights. No other termination act has; ever been 
so construed, and nothing in this termination act gives it such power. The UPA must be 
limited to its actual scope. That scope was merely to terminate federal supervision over 
the Uintah Band, a necessary consequence of terminating three quarters of its members. 
II. The Ute Tribe has no authority to determine the membership of the Uintah Band. 
The Ute Tribe's arguments regarding the membership of the Uintah Band proceed 
from the assumption that the persons terminated from federal supervision under the 1954 
Act are nothing more than individuals formerly associated with the Ute Tribe. It claims its 
authority under the 1937 tribal constitution2, without reference to the UPA's effect on that 
constitution. It is true that tribes have the exclusive right to determine their own member-
2It is not clear what provision of the Ute Constitution gives the tribal business 
committee the authority to determine the membership of the individual bands. Rather, its 
authority appears to be limited to determining membership in the Ute Tribe as a whole. 
ship. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marline/, 4 \h i I S M nl V ')«SCi IfVlf IIiVK-i „i 1'", 
56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). However, this goes for the Uintah Band as well as the Ule I • i'v 
In this regard, ihe Ute Tribe's authority is limited to the lite Tribe itself. It has no more 
ai ill ; . . :;..a.. man the UiiiUu. Band hai to determine 
who is or is not a Ute. It is th • :"^~ * ' A lirtlitT lln; I ik1 Tribe considers llic 
Respondents Uintahs or not. The Ute Tribe has no say in the matter. 
A. ihe ido e Uintah Band is not in dispute. 
Then.1 has never been uu\ question lh.it the Respondents are apart of that body of 
Indians expelled from the Ute Tribe in 1956 The** ^ i 
consists of the Indians of Utah Territory; as the Act of May 5, 1864, specifically denomi-
nates them as such. The ethnic heritage of the bulk of the Uintah Band is Shoshone, not 
I ite I'here is na dispuie that thai portion oi ihe Hmpanogos 1 ribe as it was known to 
exist from 1847 to 1867 became a constituent pnrt of (In; 1 lintah Hand, No victim oi" the 
1954 UP A has ever ceased to contend that the Act was both unjust in its inception and 
inequitable in its application, and there is no question that the UFA terminated the vast 
majority of the I 'intah Hand from ledeial supervision. None of these aspects of the Uintah 
^ . i d are inconsistent with any other, The f;i«1 I hat differing aspects have been 
e mphasized in different proceedings takes nothing away from their overall consistency. 
i. 1 he Ute rribe has actively undertaken to create divisions within the Uintah 
Band, In 2001), .•
 ?x? MM. acnommaung herself as the * I impanogos ' Fribe commenced an 
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action against Kevin Conway, the director of the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, on 
behalf of the Indians of Utah Territory, which includes the Uintah Band. This action was 
successful in obtaining the previously mentioned ruling confirming that even tribes that 
have been terminated retain the right to hunt and fish on Indian lands. Timpanogos Tribe 
v. Conwav, 286 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. April 15, 2002). 
Subsequent to obtaining the Conway ruling, it became necessary for the 
Timpanogos Tribe's counsel to withdraw from that case. The reasons are set forth in 
Addendum F, appended to this Brief. The State and the Ute Tribe thereafter colluded to 
prolong that case so as to obtain a ruling adverse to this case. These events occurred 
contemporaneously with the commencement of the State's case against Mr. Reber. The 
colloquy referred to in the Amicus brief, p. 14, occurred on February 26,2003. In March, 
2003, the full facts about the putative Timpanogos Tribe came to light. 
The Ute Tribe cannot now claim that the parties and issues in this action and those 
in the Conway case are identical. Amicus Br., p. 6. Not only are the parties not identical, 
after March 11, 2003, they were outright hostile to each other. The Respondents cannot 
be identified with any activity occurring in that case subsequent to that date, and the Ute 
Tribe knows that. 
2. Judicial estoppel has no application in this matter. The Ute Tribe implies that the 
Respondents are somehow estopped from asserting a position which the Ute Tribe alleges 
is inconsistent with the Respondents' prior position. Even if there were such an 
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inconsistency;, it would have no bearing on the issues presently before this Court kk \ 
person may not, to the prejudice of another person dem an}- position taken in a prior 
judicial proceeding between the same person or their p * ^ involving the same subject 
Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, , J I (Utah 199t> • .nasis added). "The purpose of 
* .;!• -:':il estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of 
the judicial process from conduct such as know *% misrepresentations or fraud on the 
court." hi. hfr|his - * . IN. - N ..•• c> 
that the party against whom v'Uieial estoppel is sought MIUW; *• mi^r^resented anv 
facts in the prior proceeding and where the party seeking to invoke judicial estoppel had 
equal or better access to the relevant facts.'5 Id. 
The 1 i(r 'i iihi' K elearh ptreliiikil irom assertuij.1, )uitici;il estoppel, JhisL, .illliouuh 
the Respondents would assert otherwise, the Ute Tribe ostensibly would claim thai :* •. 
not a party or privy with the State of Utah, the only party with whom the Respondents are 
now contending. Second, no party has been prejudiced, as neither the trial court nor the 
Court of Appciils inadr anv favorable tindmu as to llic Indian sil.ttus ol llic Respondents. 
rhird, there is no evidence that the Resp^iuaits ever knowingly misrepresented any facts, 
and finally, the Ute Tribe cannot deny that it has equal or better access to the relevant 
facts. I here is simpl) no basis on which u*c * u; i rme can invoke judicial estoppel, 
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B. Hunting and fishing are tribal rights. 
Hunting and fishing are tribal rights, in which individual members of a tribe have 
rights of user. United States v. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1022 (D.Utah 1982). If there are 
no tribal rights, it wouldn't matter if the Respondents are Indian or not. If there are tribal 
rights, the only question is whether the Respondents are recognized by the tribe posses-
sing the rights. Zarr v. Barlow. 800 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1986)(Indian status determined 
either by membership in tribe or by blood quantum). The Respondents have never 
claimed hunting rights on any basis other than tribal membership. 
Put another way, proving that the Respondents are Indians under the Rogers test 
would not establish the right of their tribe to hunt and fish, and proving that they are not 
Indians under Rogers would neither disprove such a tribal right, nor supersede the right of 
the tribe to determine its own membership under Santa Clara Pueblo. United States v. 
Rogers., 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 436 U.S. 49, 72, n. 
32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684, n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). 
For some odd reason, the Ute Tribe, which claims both to be an Indian tribe and to 
possess tribal rights, nevertheless refers this Court to the Rogers test. Amicus Br., p. 15. 
They should know better. The Rogers test simply has no application to this case. It is the 
Uintah Band that possesses the right to hunt and fish on the reservation, and it is solely 
the Uintah Band that can determine the Indian status of the Respondents. The 
Respondents have never asserted otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under a plain reading ofUte V. the State has no jurisdiction over the lands where 
the Respondents were accused of hunting. If this Court should nevertheless accept the 
State's claimed distinctions between "Indian land"and "Indian country" where the Tenth 
Circuit found none, there is still no question that some Indian tribe has a right to hunt on 
those lands. The Uintah Band, expelled en masse from the Ute Tribe in 1956, is one of 
those tribes, and the Respondents are members of that tribe. 
The Respondents acted in reasonable reliance upon the Tenth Circuit's holdings in 
Ute V. which defines the reservation, and Timpanogos v. Conway, which affirms the 
hunting and fishing rights of terminated tribes. Entirely independent of whether or not the 
State possessed jurisdiction, the Respondents were entitled to let a juiy determine, under 
U.C.A. §76-2-304(2), whether persons relying in good faith upon these rulings could 
possess criminal intent. If the State has jurisdiction to try the Respondents, then it has an 
obligation to afford them due process as to reasonable reliance. Since the State failed to 
do so, the ruling of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
DATED this 18th day of December, 2006. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Respondents/Cross-Petitioners 
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Peter J. Hack 
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Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP 
1550 Seventeenth St., Ste. 500 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Michael L. Humiston 
ADDENDUM F 
w t i nvc f 
Michael L. Humiston, #6749 
Attorney at Law 
23 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 486 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Tel: (435) 654-1152 
COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH 
MAR 0 7 2003 
MARKUS B. ZIMMER, CLERK 
BY 
UtPUTY CLERK 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
TIMPANOGOS TRIBE, Snake Band of 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
KEVIN CONWAY, Director, Utah Division 
of Wildlife Resources, 
Defendant 
and 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH 
AND OURAY RESERVATION, 
Defendant-Intervenor 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS 
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
AND COUNSEL'S RESPONSE TO 
UTE TRIBE'S AND DEFENDANT 
CONWAY'S JOINT MOTION 
FOR ORDER REQUIRING 
CLARIFICATION 
Civil No. 2:00 CV 734C 
Judge Tena Campbell 
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
Michael L. Humiston, being duly sworn upon his oath, states and affirms as follows: 
1. Since the commencement of this action I have served as counsel for the putative 
Timpanogos Tribe. 
2.1 undertook this litigation believing that I was acting on behalf of the Indians of Utah 
Territory. 
3. Mary Meyer represented to me that the Timpanogos Tribe constituted the Indians of 
2 
Utah Territory. 
4. Ms. Meyer represented to me that she was the authorized representative and chief 
executive of the putative Timpanogos Tribe. 
5. Ms. Meyer represented to me and to the Indiaps of Utah Territory that her expertise 
and her sole possession of rare documents left her uniquely qualified to act as Chief Executive of 
the putative Timpanogos Tribe. 
6. Commencing on May 1, 2002,1 began to question whether Ms. Meyer was in fact 
authorized to act on behalf of the Timpanogos Tribe, and whether Ms. Meyer was acting in the 
best interests of the Indians of Utah Territory. 
7. Inasmuch as I was not satisfied that Ms. Meyer was an authorized representative of the 
Timpanogos Tribe, nor that she was acting in the bests interests of the Indians of Utah Territory, I 
took steps to protect the interests of the Timpanogos Tribe and of the Indians of Utah Territory 
and refrained from imparting sensitive attorney-client information to Ms. Meyer. 
8. Over the same period, I began to question whether Ms. Meyer in fact possessed the 
unique knowledge or the singular documents which she represented she possessed, and even if she 
did possess such knowledge and documents, whether she was representing them accurately. 
9. From October through December, 2002,1 communicated with persons other than Ms. 
Meyer whom I believed in good faith to be authorized to act on behalf of the Timpanogos Tribe 
and whom I believed were acting in the best interests of the Indians of Utah Territory. 
10 In January, 2003,1 discovered that these other persons were acting under the control 
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and direction of Ms. Meyer. From that point on, I refrained from imparting information to any 
person not clearly authorized and acting in the best interests of the Indians of Utah Territory. 
11. On February 21, 2003, Ms. Meyer filed a document with the Court asserting that she 
is the chief executive of the putative Timpanogos Tribe, and accusing me of failing to 
communicate with her on behalf of the Timpanogos Tribe. 
12.1 first learned of this document when I received a copy of it from Ms. Meyer on 
February 26, 2003. She presented it to me immediately after a hearing in which I had successfully 
represented an Indian of Utah Territory up to that stage of the proceedings in State Court, and the 
day before the Utah Court of Appeals issued a ruling, which I had been instrumental in obtaining, 
overturning the conviction of another Indian of Utah Territory. 
13. Ms. Meyer's document confirmed to me that her primary concern was her personal 
prestige in the eyes of the Defendants and the Court, even if this must be obtained at the expense 
of the interests of the Timpanogos Tribe, and of the Indians of Utah Territory. 
14. Since that time I have received information leading me to believe that Ms. Meyer's 
primary concern is still not the interests of the Indians of Utah Territory, but rather what the 
viewers of the website Indianz.com will think of her. 
15. Later that same day, February 26, 2003,1 confirmed definitively that Ms. Meyer had 
no authority to act as chief executive of the Timpanogos Tribe, having never been elected by any 
members of such a body, nor by any Indians of Utah Territory. 
16. On that same day I confirmed definitively that the body posing as the tribal council of 
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the putative Timpanogos Tribe exercises no independent authority or judgment, but is appointed 
and acts entirely according to the will and at the sufferance of Ms. Meyer. 
17. The Indians of Utah Territory historically consist of several separate bainds, including 
the San Pitch, the Cucumbrah, the Pahvants, the Timpanogos, the Northwestern Shoshone, the 
Goshutes, and others. On March 2, 2003,1 learned that Ms. Meyer had deliberately excluded this 
information from the membership records of the putative Timpanogos Tribe. 
18. On the same date, I learned that the various bands of Utah Indians had never 
transferred or surrendered their rights or authority to the putative Timpanogos Tribe, and had 
never authorized that entity to act on their behalf 
19. On the same date, I learned definitively that Ms. Meyer herself is not a member of the 
historical Timpanogos Band. 
20. In summary, I learned that the putative Timpanogos Tribe has no authority to act on 
behalf of the Indians of Utah Territory, that Ms. Meyer has no authority to act on behalf of said 
Timpanogos Tribe, that the putative Timpanogos Tribe acting as Plaintiff in this action is not the 
legitimate successor in interest to the historical Timpanogos Tribe that occupied the Utah Valley 
prior to white occupation, that the tribal council of the putative Timpanogos Tribe is a figurehead, 
and that Ms. Meyer had concealed and misrepresented information, making herself appear 
indispensable in order to usurp authority over the Indians of Utah Territory. 
21. Ms. Meyer knew at the time she engaged my services and has known throughout these 
proceedings that she had never been elected by the Timpanogos Tribe nor by the Indians of Utah 
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Territory. 
22 Ms. Meyer knew at the time she engaged my services and has known throughout these 
proceedings that she was a member of the San Pitch band, that she was not a member of the 
historical Timpanogos Tribe, and that the San Pitch and the Timpanogos are separate and distinct 
entities 
23 Ms Meyer knew at the time she engaged my services and has known throughout these 
proceedings that the party presenting itself as the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe was not identical 
with the historical Timpanogos Tribe, and that neither the historical Timpanogos Tribe nor the 
Indians of Utah Territory had transferred any of their rights or powers to the Plaintiflf Timpanogos 
Tribe, nor authorized the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe to act on their behalf 
24 Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ms Meyer knowingly and intentionally represented to 
me, to the Defendants, and to the Indians of Utah Territory that she was the legitimately 
empowered leader of the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe, that the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe was 
authorized to represent the Indians of Utah Territory, and that the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe was 
a legitimate successor in interest to the rights and powers of the historical Timpanogos Tribe 
25 Ms Meyer made these representations to myself and to the Defendants with the intent 
that we rely upon those representations 
26. Both I and the Defendants have relied upon those representations in our respective 
capacities 
27 Both I and the Defendants have been damaged in our respective capacities by our 
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reliance upon those representations. 
28. Inasmuch as my services have been unwittingly utilized to perpetrate a fraud upon the 
Court, I respectfully request leave to withdraw from representing the putative Plaintiff in this 
action forthwith. 
29.1 believe it is necessary to file this Motion in order to comply with Rule 3.3 of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
30.1 believe that the interests of the party acting as the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe are 
indistinguishable from the personal interests of Mary Meyer, and that those interests are in direct 
conflict with the interests of the Indians of Utah Territory, including the historical Timpanogos 
Tribe. 
31.1 believe that I cannot represent the party acting as the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe 
without damaging the interests of the Indians of Utah Territory, including the historical 
Timpanogos Tribe. Pursuant to Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, I believe I 
am obligated to withdraw as Counsel for the party acting as the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe. 
32. In filing this Motion, I believe I have taken all steps necessary to protect the interests 
of the Indians of Utah Territory, pursuant to Rule 1.16 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
33. On March 3, 2003, the Defendants filed a Joint Motion for Order Requiring 
Clarification of Plaintiffs Intent. This is entirely understandable. 
34. In paragraph 9 of the Defendants' Motion, Defendants correctly observe that "The 
positions of Plaintiff and its attorney cannot be squared." 
35. If I am permitted to withdraw as Counsel for the party acting as the Plaintiff 
Timpanogos Tribe, the conflict noted by the Defendants will be resolved, and Ms. Meyer can 
pursue whatever course she may choose, without conflict with myself and without detriment to 
the Indians of Utah Territory. This would accomplish the clarification sought by the Defendants. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2003. 
Michael L. Humistoh 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of March, 2003. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LESLIE OLSON 
8955 South 700 East 
Sandy. Utah 84070 
My Commtealon Expires 
March 1,2004 
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